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The purpose of this paper is to outline the way in which an epistemic virtue ap-
proach can be used to address epistemological issues in law. My claim is that re-
sponsibilism is the right kind of approach. First, I will briefly examine the differ-
ence between this conception and the reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues. 
Then, I will explore two major responsibilist projects that contain several features 
required for an appropriate virtue approach to legal fact-finding. Next I will discuss 
the belief/acceptance dichotomy and attempt to show that it is acceptance – rath-
er than belief – the right type of propositional attitude to be held by legal fact-find-
ers, and that it may be regulated by intellectual virtues. In the end, it will be argued 
that the conjunction of a responsibilist epistemology and a theory of acceptance 
constitutes a good theoretical framework for the analysis of legal reasoning about 
matters of fact. 
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O objetivo deste artigo é delinear o modo como uma abordagem a partir da epis-
temologia da virtude pode ser usada para lidar com questões epistemológicas no 
direito. Minha alegação é que o responsabilismo é um tipo correto de aborda-
gem. Primeiro, vou brevemente examinar a diferença entre esta concepção e a 
concepção confiabilista das virtudes intelectuais. Em seguida, vou explorar dois 
grandes projetos responsabilistas que contêm diversas caracteristicas requeridas 
para uma abordagem a partir da teoria das vitudes que seja apropriada para a 
investigação dos fatos no direito. Depois discutirei a dicotomia crença/aceitação 
e procurarei mostrar que é a aceitação – e não a crenca – o tipo certo de atitude 
proposicional a ser assumida pelo investigador dos fatos no direito, e que esta 
atitude pode ser regulada pelas virtudes intelectuais. No final, será argumenta-
do que a conjunção entre uma epistemologia responsabilista e uma teoria da 
Virtude epistemológica e aceitação 


































































EPISTEMIC VIRTUE AND ACCEPTANCE 
IN LEGAL FACT-FINDING 
aceitação constitui um bom quadro teórico para a análise do raciocínio jurídico 
sobre questões de fato. 
Palavras-chave: Virtude epistêmica, Crença e aceitação, Responsabilismo, Investi-
gação dos fatos.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in applying 
virtue epistemology (VE, hereafter) to legal epistemology1. This 
work pretends to be a modest contribution to the field. Rather than 
aiming at the development of a novel version of VE applicable to 
law, it merely attempts to show the general features that such an 
approach would require and to stress a very concrete point: should 
the display of a virtuous epistemic character by the legal fact-finder 
have any role in achieving a successful decision about the matters 
of fact disputed in a trial, it should be acknowledged that what is 
virtuously produced is not necessarily a belief about the account of 
facts object of the decision, but an acceptance of it. Given certain 
peculiarities of the inquiry in question, belief may not necessarily 
be the propositional attitude held by the inquirer in regard with the 
account of facts taken as proven.
Our objectives in this work are the following: first, to describe the 
type of VE that best works for legal fact-finding. Second, to show 
that any attempt to apply that type of theoretical framework to law 
must recognize that exercising intellectual virtue in the legal context 
aids judges or jurors (or whoever is tasked with the finding of facts) 
in appropriately forming an acceptance -rather than a belief- about 
the version of facts declared as legally proven.
That being said, the discussion will follow the next order: the first part 
will sketch two major contributions to the field of VE. One proposed 
by Linda T. Zagzebski2, and another one by James A. Montmarquet3. 
1  A few examples of the literature on the topic are AMAYA, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012; LAI, 
2012. 
2  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996.
3  MONTMARQUET 1987, 1993, and 2007.




























































Both positions belong to a conception of VE known as responsibilism4. 
Before presenting the core theses of these contributions, we will 
succinctly review some differences between responsibilism and a 
different version of VE known as virtue reliabilism. Again, we must 
bear in mind that we have no intention here to produce a novel VE, 
so we will only outline the features of the type of epistemological 
project we find attractive for law5.
The second part will be devoted to explain the distinction between 
belief and acceptance. As said before, the aim of drawing this 
distinction is to show that it is acceptance, rather than belief, the 
propositional attitude to be held by triers of fact. On the final 
part of the work it will be suggested that if we attempt to use a 
responsibilist VE to give account of (some of the) epistemological 
problems related to legal reasoning about matters of fact, we need 
to include the dichotomy belief/acceptance as part of the conceptual 
framework. In the context of legal fact-finding, displaying a virtuous 
epistemic behavior would have as an ultimate goal to justify the 
agent’s acceptance of a version of the facts and not necessarily to 
justify her belief in it.
4  The label “responsibilism” is owed to CODE, 1984 and 1987. However, it must be said that 
responsibilism has several varieties (see BAEHR, 2011). The reason we choose these two 
approaches is that they share an important feature: both projects include an attempt to give 
conceptual priority to the notion of ‘intellectual virtue’ over other notions like ‘justification’ 
and ‘knowledge’. In contrast with this, other responsibilist approaches (like Code’s), don’t seem 
concerned with such a task. 
In our view, explaining how is it possible to reach a truthful account of the facts that triggered a 
legal dispute is one of the central tasks of legal epistemology. So, if we are interested in applying
VE to law in order to explain (or partially explain) what a ‘true verdict’ is in terms of something
like “exercises of intellectual virtue’ or ‘virtuous epistemic behavior’, then we would require an 
approach to VE with the feature in question.
5  We may ask what makes a responsibilist approach to legal epistemology particularly 
attractive and how does it differ from other approaches. Answering this would require a paper 
itself. So, for the sake of brevity, we can only say that legal decision about matters of fact seems 
in the best of cases a fallible enterprise, thus we can always remain a little skeptical about 
the truth of what is taken as proven in a courtroom. In the face of such a scenario, we may 
ask ourselves why we should abide by the outcome of any trial at all. Well, it happens that a 
responsibilist VE provides us with the theoretical resources required for placing the effort and 
appropriate epistemic behavior of the finder of facts at the very center of the epistemological 
evaluation of these outcomes. So, even in the strongest skeptical scenario, we would still be 
able to rescue something of value with the theoretical framework of a virtue approach: a 
justified outcome. If the fact-finder behaved in a virtuous manner and did everything that could 
be done in the search for truth, then she may be justified in holding such outcome as true, even 
if it is not true.
In regard with the question about how this approach differs from other approaches we can 
say that the main difference has to do with the center of the analysis. Instead of the traditional 
institutional-design-centered epistemology, instead of thinking about ways of amending 
Evidence Law so that it makes the finding truth more likely, a virtue approach is agent-centered.
For recent work on how the virtue (or aretaic) approach to the problem of justification in 
adjudication differs from other approaches, see AMAYA, 2012. 




























































2. ON VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
The origin of this contemporary movement in epistemology is 
usually attributed to Ernest Sosa6. The idea behind this “virtue 
turn” was to avoid the apparent dead end to which the debate 
between foundationalism and coherentism leads. Sosa argues for a 
readjustment in the analysis in the same fashion as it had happened 
in moral philosophy. The appearance of virtue ethics brought the 
moral agent to the center of the analysis in an attempt to leave the 
traditional action-centered approaches behind. In epistemology 
the idea would be to make the analysis agent-centered, instead of 
belief-centered.
Traditionally, epistemology was concerned with the credentials of 
beliefs. It was concerned with the conditions that should be met 
by a belief in order to become knowledge. These conditions were 
presented in an abstract way and little was said about the believer 
and the role of her epistemic qualities in the enterprise of knowing. 
What VE proposes is to place the epistemic agent at the very center 
of epistemological analysis. It is the agent’s epistemic performance 
what must be studied and evaluated since knowledge and/or 
justified belief are the product of her performance.
Another feature of several contributions to VE is the attempt to 
give conceptual priority to the notion of intellectual virtue over the 
notions of knowledge and justified belief. In other words, VE tries 
to explain concepts such as knowledge or epistemic justification in 
terms of the primitive concept of intellectual virtue.
Unsurprisingly, one of the first issues brought into discussion in VE 
is that about the nature of intellectual virtue. On this regard, two 
major approaches may be distinguished: the reliabilist approach 
and the responsibilist approach. Broadly speaking, the reliabilist 
approach – among whose most prominent defenders we can find 
Ernest Sosa, John Greco and Alvin Goldman7 – conceives intellectual 
virtue as ‘cognitive faculties’ whose exercise allow the agent to 
form a larger proportion of true beliefs than false beliefs. Typical 
examples of virtues in this sense are memory, sight and intuition. 
In opposition to this idea, responsibilists think that intellectual 
6  SOSA, 1980.
7  SOSA 1991, 1992, 2007; GRECO 1992, 2002, 2010; and GOLDMAN, 1992 and 2001.
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virtues are better understood as ‘traits of character’ like intellectual 
humility, courage or sobriety. It is through the possession and 
exercise of these traits that the agent achieves epistemic success. 
Zagzebski and Montmarquet offer two important developments on 
the line of responsibilism. We will explore them in this work.
It is important to remark that the disagreement between reliabilist 
and responsibilists about what really counts as a virtue goes beyond 
the mere terminological dispute of what the correct way to use 
the word ‘virtue’ is. Simply agreeing to keep the label of ‘virtue’ for 
‘character traits’ and stating that ‘reliable cognitive faculties’ are not 
exactly ‘virtues’ (or vice versa) cannot settle the discussion. At the 
center of it lies what different philosophers take as more fundamental 
for epistemology to fulfill its task in clarifying what knowledge is8, 
how it is attainable and what kind of capacities or dispositions are 
truly important for  succeeding in the enterprise of knowledge9. 
Roughly speaking, the reliabilist approach considers that it is the 
truth-conduciveness of cognitive faculties what matters most in 
achieving knowledge or epistemic justification. Thus, if a true belief 
is reached through the exercise of a cognitive faculty that tends 
to produce more true beliefs than false beliefs, then the belief is 
epistemically justified. In contrast, the responsibilist approach is 
more concerned with matters related to the agent’s duties as a 
knower. In general terms, virtuous epistemic behavior consists in 
conscientious efforts that the agent must display in the search for 
knowledge. Epistemic success is reached through such efforts. So 
the philosophical endeavor of explaining concepts like epistemic 
justification or knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues makes room 
for a clash of diverging intuitions about how such things can or 
should be achieved. 
8  Or even if it is its unique or central task. See, for example, ZAGZEBSKI, 2001, on this regard.
9  The labels “virtue reliabilism” and “virtue responsibilism” were first suggested in Axtell, 
1997. It is interesting to notice that there is a natural connection between virtue reliabilism 
and externalism, and between virtue responsibilism and internalism. In broad terms, the 
virtue reliabilist approach thinks of knowledge as something owed to the exercise of a 
reliable cognitive faculty that enables the agent to successfully engage with the world, while 
responsibilism thinks of it as something that is owed to the agent’s attitudes, actions and 
choices, rather than to faculties alone.  The responsibilist view advocates for a stronger link 
between belief and grounds for believing than the one that virtue reliabilism seems to endorse. 
This resembles the externalist/internalist debate in the sense that internalism (in very broad 
terms) suggests that grounds for believing must be accessible to the agent, while the externalist 
view denies that such a strong link (such access) is necessary. For more on this connection, see 
AXTELL, 1997, and BAEHR, 2011, p. 6-8 and 47-67.




























































Adding to our understanding of this debate, let us briefly consider 
an objection to the responsibilist conception suggested by Greco10. A 
central flaw in responsibilism as an epistemological project may lay in 
the fact that such an approach states requirements for knowledge so 
strong that the resulting definition of knowledge seems implausible. 
For example, Zagzebski defines knowledge, as we will see, as true 
belief that arises out of ‘acts of intellectual virtue’11. Consider a case 
like this: A pedestrian realizes that a bicycle (or something moving 
really fast) is dangerously heading towards her, so she immediately 
gets out of the way. Such realization would only amount to knowledge 
if it is reached through an act of intellectual virtue. 
The intuitions of many would be that it shouldn’t be questioned that 
the pedestrian actually knew that she was about to be ran over, even 
if it’s true that the belief was not the result of an ‘act of intellectual 
virtue’. An acceptable epistemology should be able to take this as a 
paradigmatic instance of knowledge. A responsibilist epistemology 
appears to leave many everyday cases intuitively regarded as 
knowledge out of the definition.
It may be considered that the responsibilist approach at best tells 
us something about the way in which human cognition works in a 
certain type of situations, but is not the right approach to elucidate 
the concept of knowledge. Yet, the responsibilist still has in her favor 
the fact that there seems to be an important ethical dimension in 
the enterprise of knowledge that is central to epistemology as a 
normative discipline. The responsibilist may rightfully argue that 
there is more to an accomplished and successful epistemic life than 
the mere capacity to reliably arrive at true beliefs. 
Now, setting aside the objections to responsibilism as a general 
approach to epistemology, something must be said about why it 
should be favored when addressing issues in law. And the reason 
for doing so is quite straightforward. As we mentioned (see note 2), 
it is interesting to explore how a true decision about matters of fact 
in a trial (or at least justified one) is reached through the exercise 
of intellectual virtue. However, the problem for reliabilism is that 
explaining knowledge about the facts that triggered a legal dispute 
10  GRECO, 2002 and 2000.
11  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996, p. 270.




























































just in terms of the possession of certain cognitive faculties such as 
acute vision or good memory seems to fall short. 
The search for truth in a trial is an endeavor that requires effort and 
commitment. In order to fulfill her task, a legal fact-finder must be 
moved by a due regard for truth. Being devoted to the finding of truth 
is the most fundamental element of a virtuous epistemic character 
and is a motivation that is displayed in several manners, like being 
intellectually sober or meticulous. Not being virtuous -being gullible 
and careless, for example- would most likely lead the fact-finder to 
failure. There are many epistemic perils in legal fact-finding, like the 
possibility of the information being manipulated by the parties. So, 
even if the idea of knowing through ‘acts of intellectual virtue’ seems 
like asking too much in cases like the pedestrian and the cyclist, the 
case of legal fact-finding seems to rightfully ask for that much.
Having this in mind, we will now proceed to survey the VE projects of 
Zagzebski and Montmarquet, both of which share several desirable 
features for an appropriate epistemological approach to law.
2.1 Zagzebski’s VE
Zagzebski believes that open-mindedness, thoroughness, intellectual 
courage, carefulness, etc. are the sort of excellences we can properly 
call “virtues”. There are many types of excellences. Faculties like 
good memory or accurate vision are excellences, indeed. However, 
not all excellences are virtues. 
Virtues are praiseworthy excellences. It’s true that having a 
remarkably accurate vision would give cause for praise, but this 
wouldn’t be the sense of praiseworthiness that matters for virtue. 
The sense in which virtues are praiseworthy can only be understood 
bearing in mind the blameworthiness of vice.
It is in the face of the possibility of being vicious that the being 
virtuous becomes commendable. Even if a highly reliable cognitive 
faculty is an excellence, the lack of it wouldn’t be blameworthy. 
Consider the case of accurate eyesight. It makes as much sense to 
blame people for not having a remarkably accurate vision just as it 
makes sense to blame them for not having big hands.  In contrast, it 
makes perfect sense to blame people for being utterly naive or close-
minded. Being a mathematical genius may be worthy of praise, but 
there is no blame in not being so. 
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Praiseworthiness is the most distinctive element of the traits we 
can rightfully label as virtues. The triumph of virtue over vice is an 
admirable endeavor. Being virtuous in the face of the possibility of 
not being so is the way in which epistemic virtues are praiseworthy 
and reliable cognitive faculties can’t be.
Praiseworthiness also supposes an element of choice and voluntary 
control not clearly present in the exercise of cognitive faculties. 
We can’t choose to have a good memory, but we can choose to be 
epistemically careful or reckless. If intellectual virtue is something 
over which we have voluntary control (at least to a relevant or 
substantive extent), there is room for responsibility discourse about 
its presence or absence. We can be held responsible for not carrying 
out a careful inquiry, but we can’t be blamed for not having a reliable 
memory, since usually we have no control over this.
That being said, the structure of virtue has two components12. The 
first is a motivational component. Each virtue can be defined in terms 
of a particular motivation. Open-mindedness is the motivation to be 
receptive to ideas of others. Intellectual courage is the motivation to 
withstand the opposition of others and persevere with one’s ideas if 
we deem them as valuable. Intellectual sobriety may be understood 
as the motivation to carefully examine what we are told in the 
light of the evidence supporting it. The point is that having a virtue 
means having a motivation to epistemically behave in a way that 
(intuitively) allows us to achieve a true belief. It means having the 
motivation to act in a way that puts us in the right direction to make 
cognitive contact with reality. 
The motivational component has two aspects. One is the particular 
and distinctive motivation each virtue has (staying open to the 
ideas of others, defending our views in the face of opposition, etc.). 
The other one is the motivation to achieve cognitive contact with 
reality. All intellectual virtues share this end. They only differ in the 
particular “road” each one suggest for achieving that end.
However, merely having the motivation to epistemically behave 
in a way that permits us to achieve cognitive contact with reality 
does not guarantee we reliably attain it. So, virtue needs a second 
component: a success component. Such component is brought by 
12  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996, p. 165-184.




























































entrenchment. Virtues are acquired habits. To successfully operate, 
they must lead the agent to a stable and consistent resistance of 
vice. Having a virtue means that a certain motivation is rooted 
deeply in our character.
The motivation to, say, fairly consider the ideas suggested by others 
must actually make the agent receptive to those ideas in order to 
effectively achieve its end. Cognitive contact with reality can only 
be virtuously achieved if the motivation to be open-minded is 
entrenched in the agent’s character in a fashion that keeps him 
open to every reasonable new idea and keeps him away from any 
bias derived from vicious inclinations. So, an agent is not truly open-
minded if he stays receptive only to ideas coming from people he 
likes. Virtuous character demands that the right motivation endures 
the temptation to behave viciously. A motivation is authentically 
virtuous only if it disposes the agent to act in a way that, avoiding 
vice, allows him to form a true belief. 
Summarizing, the notion of virtue we have so far is that of an 
acquired trait of character. Each virtue can be distinguished by a 
particular motivation to epistemically behave in a way that tends 
to place the agent in cognitive contact with reality. Such motivation 
must be entrenched in the agent’s character as a habit in order to 
successfully achieve its end. Virtues are stable dispositions to act 
under the right motivation and consistently avoid acting under the 
opposing vicious motivation. That makes virtues praiseworthy in a 
way that other excellences -like cognitive faculties- are not.
Having now a better grasp of the notion of virtue in question, 
we are able to see the way in which virtue leads to knowledge. 
According to Zagzebski, knowledge is explained in terms of acts of 
intellectual virtue:
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational 
component of A, is something a person with virtue A would (probably) 
do in the circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A mo-
tivation, and is such that the agent acquires a true belief (cognitive con-
tact with reality) through these features of the act13.
13  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996, p. 270.
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Knowledge is understood here as “a state of cognitive contact 
with reality14 arising out of acts of intellectual virtue”15. However, 
this definition is susceptible to multiple attacks. The first and more 
obvious problem has already been mentioned at the beginning: it 
rules out basic perceptual beliefs as instances of knowledge. The 
case of the pedestrian and the cyclist is a relevant counterexample 
since a great deal of our quotidian beliefs is produced in such a 
fashion. A definition that rules those beliefs out is too restrictive. 
Besides that, another problem arises in the case of legal fact-finding. 
If acting virtuously is knowledge-conducive, what happens when 
facts are established as virtuously as possible by the jury (or judge), 
and yet the result of their inquiry can’t be considered knowledge? 
It must be acknowledged that there is an important epistemic 
constraint in this context. The resolution about matters of fact is 
done and must only be done on the basis of the evidence admitted 
and presented at trial16. There is a set of available evidence and 
inquiry about the facts that triggered the litigation ought to restrain 
itself to that set. 
Let us think about a criminal trial. If some relevant piece of information 
that proves the guilt of the defendant has been appropriately left out 
for some legitimate reason (i.e., because a rule of exclusion requires 
so), nothing can be done about it at the point of verdict. Since 
evidence is frequently permissive, conflicting and contradictory, the 
case theories proposed on its basis are sometimes unable to defeat 
the presumption of innocence by satisfying the standard of proof. 
Even if the jury’s deliberation is done thoroughly, with sobriety and 
intellectual courage, it is still possible for the outcome to be a false 
account of the facts. It is quite a conceivable scenario to have a 
14  Zagzebski states that the notion of “cognitive contact with reality” has a broader sense 
than “knowledge”. Knowledge is but one form of cognitive contact with reality. Contact may 
also take the form of understanding or certainty, for example. So, virtue can be seen as a trait 
of character that enables the agent to attain cognitive contact with reality in several ways. This 
is an interesting point since the inclusion of such notions expands the scopes of epistemology 
and gives rise to questions about the centrality for the field of the task of giving an account 
of knowledge. In any case, if “knowledge” where to be equated with “cognitive contact with 
reality”, Zagzebski’s definition would be circular. Since the latter has a broader sense, there is no 
such circularity.
15  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996, p. 270-271.
16  Surely, there are many other constraints like the prohibition of drawing any inference out of 
a defendant’s decision not to testify during a trial. The jury has the duty to regard as irrelevant 
the defendant’s silence. However, given the purposes of this work, we will only focus on the 
“admission” constraint that stablishes what counts as evidence and what doesn’t.




























































resolution about matters of fact that is not knowledge in spite of 
being the product of epistemically virtuous action.
One reaction to this would be to simply reject that legal fact-finding 
can be done virtuously at all. An inquiry that establishes that many 
obstacles to the discovery of truth is vicious by nature. However, this 
would be too hasty. What can be said is that maybe legal fact-finding 
is not always knowledge-conducive. But there’s no need to embrace 
any species of radical skepticism. We can still assume that truth is, at 
least in principle, attainable in this context. The point is that, given 
what is at stake in a trial, other important things (like the protection 
of constitutional rights, for example) come into consideration when 
establishing the facts. Now, even if finding the truth is somewhat 
harder in this sort of inquiry than in others, virtuous epistemic 
character may still be demanded from the multiple agents that 
participate in fact-finding since there seems to remain an important 
ethical dimension in this type of inquiry.
2.2 Montmarquet’s VE
Sometimes our actions are blameworthy. If those blameworthy 
actions are based on wrong beliefs, then surely there must be a 
way to ground blameworthiness for action in blameworthiness 
for belief. Think about the case of a racist, for example. This man 
believes there is something about people of a certain ethnic group 
that makes them untrustworthy. On the basis of such a belief, he 
engages in all kind of actions that show his despise for this people. 
James A. Montmarquet project is concerned with the possibility 
of basing responsibility for action in doxastic responsibility. On his 
view, epistemic virtues are seen as traits of character that enable us 
to believe responsibly, to believe what we ought.
A belief achieved and held in an epistemically responsible 
manner is a justified belief in an important sense. It is a belief to 
which we are entitled. Following Kornblith, we may understand 
epistemic responsibility in the following terms: «Justified belief 
is belief which is the product of epistemically responsible action; 
epistemically responsible action is action guided by a desire to 
have true beliefs»17.
17  KORNBLITH, 1983, p. 47.
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At the core of epistemic responsibility what we find is the desire 
for truth. But desire for truth is not enough. It may be a necessary 
condition for epistemic responsibility, but not a sufficient one. To 
notice this, Montmarquet proposes the example of an epistemic 
fanatic who believes that her methods for interpreting certain 
sacred texts continuously generate new and powerful truths. This 
epistemic fanatic genuinely desires truth but only pays attention to 
her methods and stays closed to any sort of criticism or suggestion. 
Evidently, the mere desire for truth does not render her epistemic 
behavior responsible. So, trying to give account of how a truly 
epistemically responsible character would be, Montmarquet 
comes up with the notion of epistemic virtues18. Responsibility, 
understood as the desire for truth, can be regarded as the central 
virtue but it must be complemented with other virtues. These 
complementary virtues can be classified into three groups: virtues 
of impartiality, virtues of intellectual sobriety, and virtues of 
intellectual courage19.
The virtues of impartiality are qualities that a responsible epistemic 
agent must have as a member of an epistemic community. They 
guide her interactions with other epistemic agents. In this group 
we may find virtues like the open-mindedness and intellectual 
humility. The virtues of intellectual sobriety are qualities that tend 
to make the agent careful and help her avoid hasty inferences 
or being too gullible. Here we may find virtues like intellectual 
carefulness and thoroughness or meticulousness. Finally, among the 
virtues of epistemic courage, we may find virtues like intellectual 
perseverance, which is the tenacity to resist opposition to our ideas 
or research lines, particularly when the opposition arises out of the 
sometimes tyrannical or oppressive rule of the beliefs accepted by 
the majorities. 
All of these virtues supplement the desire for truth. They are ways 
of being responsible. In our search for truth, we must stay open 
to new ideas or be willing to withstand opposition, and so on. 
These qualities regulate the desire for having true beliefs. They are 
excellences that a truth desiring person would want to have. 
18  MONTMARQUET, 1987 and 1993.
19  MONTMARQUET, 1993, p. 23.




























































That being said, we may now proceed to highlight a very 
importantaspect about the VE project in question: truth-
conduciveness is not considered a defining feature of virtue. The 
reason for this is a very well-known skeptical scenario. Let us suppose 
that, because of the intervention of a demon, we are sent to a world 
where all the traits that we regard as virtues lead to falsehoods 
instead of truths. Furthermore, it’s a world were vicious traits like 
epistemic recklessness are truth-conducive. Would this make us 
change our mind and start considering vices as the real virtues and 
virtues as vices? For some, it wouldn’t. 
We may feel intuitively compelled to assume that even if virtue 
is not truth-conducive in the demon’s world, it may still provide 
justification. If an inquiry of any kind leads to a false result and yet 
the inquiry has been done under virtuous standards, we may still 
feel that the resulting belief is in an important sense justified. We 
may still think that we are somehow entitled to hold that belief.
So, for virtue to remain desirable, truth-conduciveness may not need 
to be a defining feature. It would still connect us with epistemic 
justification in a particular sense20. To understand it, a distinction 
between two types of justification21 must be drawn: pure epistemic 
justification and practical epistemic justification22. To explore the 
distinction let us consider an example: A jury is dealing with a criminal 
case. In that case, much of the decisive evidence comes from the 
testimony of scientific experts. After meticulously considering all of the 
evidence and arguments, the jury reaches at the conclusion that the 
defendant did not commit the crime. Let us now suppose that, years 
after the trial, a substantial part of the scientific assumptions used by 
the experts for the explanation of the evidence is proved to be utterly 
wrong. Would this mean that the jury’s conclusion was not justified? 
20  By giving up truth-conduciveness and keeping justification, Montmarquet believes an 
important intuition is saved. As all of us know, throughout history there have been many 
brilliant people like Aristotle, Galileo, or Newton whose theories strongly differed in matters 
of truth-conduciveness. Yet, we may still regard those men as somehow equal in matters of 
justification. Just because Newton proved to be right about some things and that Aristotle was 
wrong, we would not say that Aristotle was not justified in believing what he believed. Also, 
we would probably not say that because Newton was right he was virtuous while Aristotle was 
vicious. So, if truth-conduciveness were to be understood as a defining element of an epistemic 
virtuous character, then we would have problems dealing with intuitions like this.
21  Some insights relevant for this distinction can be traced in Kornblith’s distinction between 
ideal reasoning and epistemically responsible reasoning (KORNBLITH, 1983).
22  MONTMARQUET, 2007.




























































It can be said that certainly the type of epistemic justification the 
jury has is not the kind of justification that matters for knowledge. 
They lack pure epistemic justification. However, assuming they 
reached their conclusion on grounds obtained to the best of their 
effort, we may still hold them practically justified. Error was not 
produced by a lack of effort or the lack of a due regard for truth. It 
was not produced by vicious epistemic behavior. 
Practical epistemic justification is a sort of justification that is not as 
relevant for knowledge as it is relevant for the evaluation of action. 
Let us remember that Montmarquet is originally concerned with the 
possibility of grounding responsibility for action in responsibility for 
belief. The notion of practical epistemic justification allows us to give 
account of such grounding. 
An action A based (or partly based) on a belief B has practical 
epistemic justification if B is obtained through the display of 
appropriate efforts motivated by a due regard for truth. Such “due 
regard for truth” can be understood as having a desire for truth 
properly supplemented by the possession of intellectual virtues 
of the three types mentioned above. So, virtue may not bear pure 
epistemic justification since it is not necessarily truth-conducive, but 
it provides practical justification. Epistemically responsible action in 
Montmarquet’s sense (desire for truth plus intellectual virtue) leads 
to belief with practical epistemic justification. 
So we have seen that the project in question is mainly concerned with 
giving account of responsibility for belief. This can be particularly 
useful for cases in which belief is part of what explains action. Legal 
fact-finding appears to be one of those cases. We have also seen 
that it allows for a distinction between epistemological discussions 
about the concepts of pure epistemic justification (that which is 
required for knowledge) and practical epistemic justification (that 
which is required for epistemically well-grounded action). This 
distinction may have its equivalent in legal epistemology. Such field 
raises concerns for both the truth of legal decision about matters of 
fact and the doxastic responsibility of epistemic agents involved in 
its production. This project allows us to address the second group 
of concerns by providing a notion of epistemically responsible 
(virtuous) action, which is thought to bear epistemic justification of 
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With this picture in mind, we will now show that this responsibilist 
view of virtue as a trait of character that allows us to believe 
responsibly requires a slight amendment in order to be successfully 
applied to the field of proof and evidence in law.
3. BELIEF VS ACCEPTANCE IN LEGAL FACT-FINDING
So far we have sketched two major contributions to the responsibilist 
version of VE. Both contributions share worries about epistemic 
responsibility. They suggest that virtuous epistemic behavior is the 
one governed by the possession of traits like open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, and intellectual thoroughness, among others. 
On both accounts, displaying a virtuous epistemic behavior is 
required for the correct formation of beliefs. Additionally, both 
contributions share the underlying assumption that beliefs are, at 
least to some extent, voluntary23.
Our purpose now will be to challenge the idea that belief is the 
propositional attitude that triers of fact (whether they be judges 
or juries) must hold in relation to the facts considered proven in 
court. To do so, we will introduce the distinction between belief 
and acceptance by focusing on two crucial features of the latter: its 
voluntariness and its context dependence. The conclusion we want 
to reach is that it is acceptance, rather than belief, the propositional 
attitude that we may expect to be formed in an epistemically 
virtuous way when deciding matters of fact in law. This means that 
a responsibilist virtue approach to legal epistemology must be 
amended by taking into account this distinction.  
The first issue at hand is doxastic voluntariness24. The main 
contemporary source of objection to the thesis that beliefs are 
voluntary is Bernard Williams25. We will start by following this road.
If we think about the notion of belief, some of us may suddenly 
realize that there is something odd about considering it voluntary. 
23  ZAGZEBSKI, 1996, p. 58-69; MONTMARQUET, 1993, p. 79-96 and 2008.
24  The literature on the thesis of doxastic voluntarism is vast. Unfortunately we cannot devote 
enough space here to address it appropriately. Should the reader be interest in the subject, 
please refer to WILLIAMS, 1973; HEIL, 1984; GINET, 2001; FELDMAN, 2001; AUDI, 2001; 
MONTMARQUET, 2008; HIERONYMI, 2009; and, of course, the classics CLIFFORD, 1877, and 
JAMES, 1896.
25  WILLIAMS, 1973, p. 136-151.




























































This is because beliefs appear to aim at truth.  Believing that p means 
believing “It is the case that p”. Beliefs are states generated mainly by 
evidence. We don’t decide or choose what to believe, it just happens 
to us once we are acquainted with relevant evidence. For example, 
I don’t choose to believe that there is a cup of coffee in front of me. 
I just happen to believe it by simply opening my eyes and looking at 
the cup. The evidence “strikes my mind” and I believe accordingly.
If we were able to believe at will, we would be able to believe something 
even in the face of evidence to the contrary. But we are not able (if 
we are being minimally rational) to believe something in the face of 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, we are not able to believe at will. 
What happens in cases when, say, a woman claims that she can’t 
believe that her car has been stolen? Does this mean that she is 
willingly resisting a belief? Well, it may be that she is just expressing 
her wish for reality to be different from what it is. Her expression 
would then be just figurate speech for saying that she finds it 
psychologically difficult to come to grips with reality. Given what 
is at stake, her evidence standards unconsciously increase and the 
evidence she is acquainted with does not fulfill it.
However, there is another interpretation of this kind of cases. Let us 
assume now that there is no unconscious increase in the evidence 
standards. If someone shows us strong evidence suggesting that our 
car has been stolen, we can’t avoid believing so out of mere will. 
Thus, what we may mean when we say “I can’t believe someone 
stole my car” is that we refuse to accept that our car has been stolen.
Acceptance can be characterized as having or adopting “…a policy 
of deeming, positing, or postulating that p - i.e. of including that 
proposition or rule among one’s premises for deciding what to do or 
think in a particular context”26. It has two important features. First, it 
is a voluntary act since it consists in adopting the policy of deeming a 
proposition as true and including it in our reasoning in order to reach 
a decision. One can either choose to adopt such policy or refuse to 
do so. Second, the reasons that ground it are not always epistemic 
reasons. While belief is grounded in evidence, acceptance can be 
grounded in reasons aside from evidence, e.g. a rule.
26  COHEN, 1992, p. 4. See also COHEN, 1989, p. 389. As the reader may note, the notion of 
acceptance presented in this paper is in great debt with Cohen’s idea about the notion.
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To show this last point, let us consider another example. Suppose 
that a friend is in troubles with the police. The evidence at hand 
shows that our friend is responsible for the bad deed he’s been 
arrested for. Inevitably, the evidence causes the belief that he 
carried out the bad deed. Yet, out of solidarity, we decide to help him 
acting under the premise that he is innocent. However, solidarity is 
not evidence. Hence, it can’t be a reason for belief, though it can be 
a reason for acceptance.
Nevertheless, acceptance can be done for epistemic reasons, just like 
belief. We can accept a given proposition because of the evidence. 
This means that belief can be a prima facie reason for acceptance. 
It is not unusual for belief and acceptance to go hand in hand. 
We frequently accept what we believe. Belief can guide action as 
much as acceptance can. The distinction becomes important when 
evidence is not the right type of reason for action. A salesman may 
act under the premise that “the customer is always right” even in the 
face of abundant evidence to the contrary. So, acceptance has the 
possibility of admitting both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. 
The latter are not the sort of inputs relevant for the production of 
beliefs, but are relevant for actions and decisions. Such inputs or 
reasons can be rules, objectives, policies, prudential reasons, etc. 
As it is becoming clear now, acceptance is not necessarily truth-
directed as belief. We do not necessarily accept p because we 
believe that p is true. Acceptance consists in a voluntary act of 
including a proposition in our reasoning as if it were true, and acting 
in accordance with its consequences. As we said, such inclusion 
can be done either for epistemic reasons (evidence) or for other 
reasons, like trying to achieve a certain goal or objective. This makes 
of acceptance susceptible to teleological explanation while belief, 
on the other hand, is susceptible to causal explanation at most. 
With the possibility of not necessarily being truth-directed, but 
instead goal-directed, the notion of acceptance allows us to give 
account of the epistemic behavior of agents in situations where 
acting on the basis of belief comes at odds with the achievement of 
certain goals or objectives that the agent has. A typical example of a 
situation like this is that of a lawyer defending a client in a criminal 
case. His beliefs about the innocence or guilt of the client may 




























































conflict with his duties as a lawyer and, consequently, have to be 
regarded as irrelevant. His beliefs must not guide his actions since 
that may not be in the client’s best interest. He is expected to act 
as if she were innocent. Hence, he must accept that proposition in 
order to fulfill his duties as lawyer.
That being said, we can conclude that acceptance is clearly voluntary 
while belief appears not to be so. However, acceptance has another 
feature that makes it the right candidate to describe the attitude 
of agents in the determination of facts in a trial. Such feature is its 
context dependence.
Belief is a state that remains through different contexts. A person 
cannot be expected to believe a proposition p in a context C and, at 
the same time, not to believe it in a context C’. It seems implausible 
to say that someone, for example, believes something as a mother 
and does not believe it as a businesswoman. This is only possible if 
there is an inconsistency or conflict in her system of beliefs or if she 
is somehow able to change her mind (modify her beliefs) whenever 
her roles or duties change.
 Let us consider another hypothetical case. A trier of facts learns 
about some evidence that is never submitted into the proceedings 
by the parties. Once such evidence has struck on the trier’s mind, a 
belief B is formed. At the moment of making a decision, the trier has 
to disregard B. Does this mean that the trier believes B in her private 
doxastic context and, at the same time, does not believes B in her 
role as a trier of facts? The answers is no. What happens is that she 
believes B, but she accepts something different from B given her 
responsibilities as a trier of facts. This does not suppose a problem. 
Acceptance has the “flexibility” necessary to deal with changes of 
context. Stalnaker suggests the same point in the following terms: 
A person may accept something in one context, while rejecting it or sus-
pending judgment in another. There need be no conflict that must be 
resolved when the difference is noticed, and he need not change his 
mind when he moves from one context to another27.
Acceptance has a practical nature. As we have already stated, it is not 
necessarily truth-directed and its formation admits reasons aside 
27  STALNAKER, 1984, p. 80-81. In this regard, see also BRATMAN, 1992, p. 4-5.
































































from evidence. Usually, these other reasons come from the context. 
The case of agents finding facts in a trial is a clear case of this. When 
determining facts, juries or judges must restrain their reasoning to 
the evidence admitted in the proceedings.  It is not surprising for a 
constraint like this to cause a difference between what the trier of 
fact believes and what she accepts. In fact, the difference may occur 
for at least six different reasons identified by Jordi Ferrer28:
1) The trier’s belief is irrational. It is not consistent with the 
available evidence;
2) As in the example above, the trier has learned of some piece 
of evidence that was not integrated to the proceedings. This 
evidence causes a certain belief, but she cannot use it to ground 
her decision;
3) The trier had access to evidence that was illegally obtained (in 
the violation of constitutional rights, for example) or that had to 
be rejected for some other legal reason. Again, the trier cannot 
get rid of the influence such evidence has on the formation of her 
beliefs, but she cannot make use of it to reach a decision;
4) The evidence available is not enough to defeat a legal 
presumption. Consequently, the presumption is still operational 
and the decision must be based on it;
5) Certain facts are not disputed. All the parties accept them as 
true;
6) The application of a legal rule concerning evidence 
predetermines the result of the decision about facts.
These situations render the state of belief unavailable as a correct 
grounding for the decision about facts in law. The triers of facts’ 
beliefs, whether they are true or false, must be regarded as irrelevant 
criteria for the correctness of the decision. What matters is what they 
can objectively justify through the evidence legally available. They 
have the duty to take into consideration the evidence incorporated 
into the proceedings, and only that evidence. Notice that this means 
that, in the case of legal fact-finding, reasons for acceptance are 
epistemic in nature (acceptance is reached in the light of evidence). 
Yet, such acceptance does not necessarily coincide with what is 
28  FERRER, 2006, p. 297. For a Spanish version of this, see FERRER, 2005, p. 83-84.




























































believed because the evidence available for acceptance may not be 
the same evidence available for belief.
Legal fact-finding is a context defined, among other things, by the 
existence of rules that establish what counts as evidence, how 
it becomes available, how to reason about it, etc. So, even if our 
case against the voluntariness of belief were weak, even if we could 
somehow voluntarily come to the state of belief, belief would still 
be unsuitable for deciding matters of fact in a trial. The epistemic 
constraint posed by legal rules does not have the capacity to produce 
a change of belief. We can’t forget a piece of evidence just because 
a rule says so. Instead, the constraint can make us modify what we 
accept. So, it is acceptance, rather than belief, the propositional 
attitude under which triers of fact ought to reach their decision.
4. VIRTUOUS ACCEPTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL 
FACT-FINDING
We have explored two major responsibilist projects, both of which 
contain important features required for an appropriate virtue 
approach to the problem of legal proof. On the one hand, from 
Zagzebski’s project we obtain a good picture of what virtue is. On the 
other hand, Montmarquet’s view allows us to see why we want it.
Virtues are acquired -and praiseworthy- traits of character that 
express an agent’s regard for truth. We want agents -we want judges 
and/or jurors- to have these traits and act under a due regard for 
truth because it provides them practical epistemic justification.
As we have mentioned, legal fact-finding is a type of inquiry where 
some obstacles appear in the search for truth. The outcome of legal 
fact-finding may perfectly consist in regarding as proven a false 
proposition or not regarding as proven a true one. This is owed, to 
a substantial extent, to the fact that there is an epistemic constraint 
in the inquiry. A fact-finder behaving in an epistemically virtuous 
manner would not be free from that constraint. She is expected to 
consider only the evidence incorporated to the proceedings and to 
follow the legal rules and standards governing such evidence. So, 
the exercise of epistemic virtue does not guarantee by itself that 
truth is achieved in this context.




























































Now, even if those conditions prevent epistemically virtuous action 
from providing grounds necessary for getting the truth, virtuous 
action still provides the grounds necessary for practical epistemic 
justification. Given the epistemic constraint, a legal fact-finder may 
unknowingly lack the grounds necessary to reach a true account of 
the facts disputed at trial. However, she may still be epistemically 
justified given her appropriate epistemic efforts. 
We have also discussed the notion of acceptance. We have 
identified two main features that make it a good candidate for being 
the propositional attitude held by legal fact-finders in relation to 
the outcome of their inquiry. Such features are voluntariness and 
context dependence. We have reviewed as well a list of situations 
that give place to a discrepancy between what the fact-finder may 
believe and what she must accept under the epistemic constraint. If 
belief were the attitude to be held, the situations mentioned would 
require the fact-finder to be able to change her beliefs at will in order 
to avoid any discrepancy. This appears to be implausible. 
Beliefs are not produced, nor removed or changed, at will. Or at least 
not the kind of beliefs that legal fact-finders have to deal with. These 
beliefs are produced by evidence and are expected to change only 
when something in the evidence changes.  Acceptance, on the other 
hand, is clearly a voluntary act. It consists in treating a proposition as 
if it were true, including it in our reasoning, and acting in accordance 
to its consequences. Acceptance can also be done in one context and 
not done in another, without bearing a conflict or inconsistency. This 
shows that it has the right features to be the propositional attitude 
susceptible of epistemically virtuous formation when reasoning 
about matters of fact in law. 
If we are interested in including a responsibilist VE analysis in legal 
epistemology, it must be acknowledged that the correct formation 
of belief cannot be the aim of virtuous epistemic action. Virtue 
responsibilism is originally concerned with this. However, when 
applied to the understanding of how facts are established in a trial, 
it must be concerned with the correctness of acceptance. 
It must also be acknowledged that the exercise of virtues is not 
necessarily truth-conducive in the context of inquiry in question 
because of the constraint on what counts as valid evidence. However, 
virtue can still provide practical epistemic justification.
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Once these points are admitted, we can identify the place of a 
responsibilist approach in legal epistemology. As we said before, 
there are at least two major lines of philosophical concerns in legal 
epistemology. The first line has to do with questions about truth and 
“pure” justification in the finding of facts. The second line has to do 
with questions about epistemic responsibility. An approach following 
the line sketched by the two projects presented in this work would 
be well suited to give account of the second line of concerns.
Under such a view, epistemic virtues are trait of characters that 
entitle the agent (that is, give her practical epistemic justification) 
to act under the acceptance of certain premise. So, even if virtue 
doesn’t warrant by itself the truth of the outcome of the agent’s 
inquiry, it does provide warrant of the integrity of the investigation. 
Since what is at stake in the context of legal fact-finding is the freedom 
or the wealth of members of our community, fact-finders have the duty 
to display their best effort. Successful cognitive contact with reality in 
that context takes more than acute eyesight or good memory or any 
ability of that kind. It takes commitment, perseverance, humility and 
thoroughness, among other things. Should traits of that sort govern 
the epistemic behavior of the fact-finder, then it may be said that her 
verdict is a case of virtuous acceptance.
A theory of acceptance explains in a natural fashion how deliberation 
and decision about matters of fact is done by fact-finders since it 
successfully shows how the usual divorce between what the fact-
finder believes and what she ultimately accepts is perfectly possible. 
Such a theory in conjunction with a responsibilist conception of 
intellectual virtue gives us a good conceptual framework to identify 
what the desirable epistemic agency for legal fact-finding is. It gives 
us important tools to state how a good finder of facts should drive 
herself in the epistemic domain while in a court of law.
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